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Abstract. This article analyses the effect of fixed assets and goodwill assets on South 
African firms’ debt ratios. The difference and system generalized method of moment es-
timation results reveal that fixed assets and goodwill assets have significant and positive 
relationship with firms’ debt ratios. To secure long-term debt, fixed assets and goodwill 
assets are required as collateral by creditors. Our results show firms’ adjust to long-run 
optimal debt level, but at a slow adjustment rate. Our results suggest there are costs 
preventing South African firms from adjusting faster to their long-run optimal debt level. 
The practical implication of the paper is that policy makers should promote policies that 
encourage further development of the capital market. Moreover, firms need both fixed 
assets and goodwill assets as collateral to raise the desired optimal debt that maximizes 
firm value.
Keywords: capital structure, debt ratio, trade-off theory, fixed assets; goodwill assets, 
panel GMM.
JEL Classification: G32, G33. 
Introduction 
At moderate levels, debt increases firm value in the real world where firms can take 
advantage of tax savings from debt financing. However, higher debt finance leads to 
financial distress and bankruptcy. Especially during a recession like the recent financial 
crisis, firms with high debt in their capital structure face increased risk of bankruptcy. 
The trade-off theory argues market imperfections such as bankruptcy and transaction 
costs make the capital structure (debt – equity mix) relevant. Specifically, the dynamic 
trade-off theory argues there is a difference between target debt and observed debt. 
Firms correct any deviation to avoid bankruptcy at high debt level. In South Africa, 
there are cases of firms going bankrupt because of excessive debt (Ezeoha, Botha 2012; 
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Akinboade, Makina 2009). This bankruptcy problem is explainable using trade-off the-
ory and dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure. 
Trade-off theory is static, but firms in real world run for many years, and in changing 
environments. Specifically, firms in South Africa operate in an economic and business 
environment that changes rapidly as well as business cycles stages from 1945 to 2009 
(Akinboade, Makina 2009). Therefore, capital structure of firms in South Africa would 
change with up and down movements of the business cycles. Thus, this suggests a need 
to analyze the effect of fixed assets and goodwill assets on South African firms’ debt 
using dynamic model. To the best of our knowledge, studies that analyze the effect of 
fixed assets and goodwill assets on South African firms’ debt are hard to find. 
Specifically, the main purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of fixed assets and 
goodwill assets on South African firms’ debt ratios. We add goodwill assets to determi-
nants of debt because banks accept goodwill assets (as well as fixed assets) as collateral 
before granting debt finance to firms. Recently, Loumioti (2011) has found that twenty-one 
percent of secured loan includes intangible assets such as goodwill as loan collateral. We 
organize the paper as follows: section 1 presents literature review. Section 2 describes the 
data and method. Section 3 discusses the results while the last section concludes the paper.
1. Literature review 
The search for an optimal capital structure entails deciding on proportion of debt and 
equity mix in firms’ capital structure, and this is one of the main tasks in the process of 
financial management. Theories explaining capital structure variation across firms range 
from capital structure irrelevance proposed by Modigliani, Miller (1958) to various rel-
evant theories. The dynamic trade-off theory explains how firms make capital structure 
decisions in practice. However, empirical results remain inconclusive (Flannery, Rangan 
2006). After over fifty years of strong debate, researchers are yet to reach consensus on 
unifying theory that could comprehensively explain many facts about how firms make 
capital structure decisions in the real world (Frank, Goyal 2008). This is not surpris-
ing because different theories of capital structure emphasize different issues, making it 
challenging to have unify theory of capital structure.
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue capital structure is irrelevant under the assumption 
of a perfect capital market. If the capital market is perfect, the capital structure deci-
sion is irrelevant. However, researchers have challenged Modigliani and Miller capital 
structure irrelevance, based on arguments that assumption of perfect capital market is 
unrealistic. This leads to an interesting debate on internal versus external financing and 
stimulate further research in this area. Research has shown that Modigliani and Miller 
theory fails if we consider bankruptcy, transaction costs and agency costs (Frank, Goyal 
2008). Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that Modigliani and Miller theory does not pro-
vide a realistic description of how firms should set up their capital structure. However, 
it provides a theoretical understanding why capital structure may be relevant. From 
academic question raised by Modigliani and Miller, theories such as the trade-off theory 
and its improved version dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure evolves.
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Myers (1984) introduces the trade-off theory of capital structure where firms trade-off 
the benefits of debt against the costs of debt (bankruptcy costs). Specifically, trade-off 
theory states optimal debt exists where marginal benefit and costs of debt are equal. The 
improved version- dynamic trade-off theory argues firms adjust debt to the optimal level 
to remove the deviation. Further, it assumes that firms have long-run optimal debt that 
depends on firm-specific characteristics. Firm-specific characteristics vary over firms 
or over both time and firms (Faulkender et al. 2012; Frank, Goyal 2008). 
The dynamic trade-off theory argues adjustment costs make debt sub optimal. There-
fore, firms should adjust to their optimal debt level in order to avoid bankruptcy at 
higher debt level (Heshmati 2001). Hovakimian et al. (2001) find that firms adjust to-
wards an optimal debt level and this optimal debt level may change over time if firms’ 
profitability and stock price change. 
De Miguel and Pindado (2001) develop a target adjustment model that explains firm’s 
debt in the previous period and the optimal debt level. The optimal debt level expressed 
as a function of well-known firm specific characteristics, such as profitability, growth 
and fixed assets. De Miguel and Pindado (2001) results show that Spanish firms face 
lower adjustment costs compare with US firms. De Miguel and Pindado (2001) find-
ings imply Spanish firms adjust faster to optimal debt level compare with U.S firms 
because adjustment costs have an inverse relation to the speed of adjustment. Similarly, 
Fama and French (2002) argue optimal debt is difficult to observe but we can determine 
it. However, Generalized Method of Moments estimation gives a better estimate and 
adjustment speed to the optimal debt level.
Loof (2004) compares the capital structure of different types of financial systems such 
as market-based (USA and UK) and bank-based system (Swedish). Loof (2004) results 
reveal that deviation from optimal debt level is smaller for US firms using more equity 
to compare with Swedish firms. Leary and Roberts (2005) argue that with adjustment 
costs, firms rebalance their capital structure occasionally. 
1.1. Previous estimations of optimal debt 
Optimal debt is not observable but we may estimate it from the data. Researchers 
(Shyam-Sunder, Myers 1999; Jalilvand, Harris 1984; Taggart 1977) use the long-term 
average as the optimal debt level. The limit with long-term average is that debt is 
constant over time. However, optimal debt changes over time as firm characteristics 
changes. Recently, Faulkender et al. (2012), Kayhan and Titman (2007), Korajczyk 
and Levy (2003), Fama and French (2002) adopt a two-step estimation procedure. This 
allows equation for the optimal debt estimated in first stage and fitted values then sub-
stituted into the target adjustment equation. The two-stage estimation procedure problem 
is that errors in first stage carry forward into the second stage. 
Further, Flannery and Rangan (2006) adopt single step estimation and substitute opti-
mal equation into the target adjustment equation to estimate the optimal debt in one 
single equation. They use external instruments that are unreliable because of measure-
ment bias. Specifically, Lemmon et al. (2008) suspect that lagged book debt use as an 
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instrument for market debt in Flannery and Rangan (2006) study is a weak instrument. 
However, Hui et al. (2006) improve target debt measures because they allow target 
debt to depend on time and mean reverting. Nevertheless, the use of the Panel Gener-
alized Method of Moments estimation in this study will give a better estimate of the 
optimal debt ratio. The next section further highlights empirical studies in developed 
and developing countries that find positive and negative relation between fixed assets 
and debt ratios. 
1.2. Empirical evidence on the relation between fixed assets and debt ratios 
Most studies in developed countries (see Rajan, Zingales 1995; Titman, Wessels 1988; 
Ozkan 2001 among others) find a positive relationship between fixed asset and debt, 
but developing countries report mixed results. For instance, Um (2001) and Wiwattana-
kantang (1999) report a positive relationship between fixed asset and debt in Korea and 
Thailand respectively. Conversely, studies of Booth et al. (2001) in ten developing coun-
tries and Huang and Song (2006) in China find that fixed asset has a negative relation-
ship with debt. However, Booth et al. (2001) argue that the relationship between debt and 
fixed assets depends on the type of debt. Similarly, Bevan and Danbolt (2002) find a pos-
itive relationship between fixed assets and long-term debt in the UK. Besides, Banerjee 
et al. (2004) argue that UK firms have optimal capital structure. They find that fixed 
assets have a positive relationship with debt and all other variables carry expected signs.
The findings of the relationship between debt ratios and fixed assets do not differ much 
across developed countries review. This shows factors that affect the capital structure 
in developed countries also affect capital structure in developing countries. The result 
is not surprising because developed countries have institutional similarities. Conversely, 
developing countries have different legal and institutional traditions. Thus, financial 
markets in developing countries would be different compare with financial markets 
in developed countries. Kunt and Maksimovic (1994) examine the capital structure of 
largest public firms in ten developing countries, which include Africa. They use Zimba-
bwe, Jordan, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, and Korea as 
samples. Kunt and Maksimovic (1994) argue there are differences in financial market 
development between the United States and countries use in their study. However, vari-
ables that explain the capital structure in the United States explain capital structure in 
developing countries. They find evidence supporting the trade-off theory and agency 
theory in sampled countries. However, Kunt and Maksimovic (1994) find a negative 
relation between debt and fixed assets. This suggests that markets for long-term debt in 
developing countries do not function effectively. 
Similarly, Booth et al. (2001) research if the capital structure theory has application in 
developing countries with different financial structure. Booth et al. (2001) employ three 
measures of debt ratio namely: total debt ratio, long-term book debt ratio, and long-
term market debt ratio. The study shows that fixed assets have positive relationships 
with long-term debt ratio, but negatively related to total debt ratio. Booth et al. (2001) 
conclude that variables that affect debt ratios in developing countries also affect debt 
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ratios in developed countries. Similarly, we expect variables that explain the capital 
structure in developed countries to explain the capital structure of South African firms. 
Specifically, we expect fixed assets to be important determinant of capital structure in 
South Africa. 
Booth et al. (2001) point out that long-term debt ratios of developing countries are lower 
compared with developed countries. Booth et al. (2001) findings imply that markets 
for long-term debt are not effectively functioning in developing countries. They argue 
their results are consistent with results of Rajan and Zingales (1995). The market for 
long-term debt is not functioning properly in developing countries but South Africa is 
an exception because they have well-functioning bond market that is comparable with 
bond markets in developed countries. Thus, South Africa debt ratio may be similar to 
debt ratio in developed countries. 
In India, as a developing country, Bhaduri (2002) finds that fixed assets play important 
role as determinant of optimal debt for Indian firms. Besides, they report large size In-
dian firms depend more on long-term debt. Similarly, Huang and Song (2006) examine 
capital structure determinants in Chinese market. They find long-term debt ratio, total 
debt ratio and total liability ratio have positive relationships with fixed assets. Huang 
and Song (2006) findings are consistent with the findings of Chen (2004). Thus, India 
and China firms follow the trade-off theory since fixed assets have positive relationships 
with debt ratios in both countries.
Recently, in Central and Eastern European countries, Delcoure (2007) find fixed assets 
have positive relationships with debt ratios. In addition, Delcoure (2007) find a nega-
tive relation between debt ratios and profit. Delcoure (2007) concludes the pecking 
order theory and the trade-off theory explain the capital structure puzzle in developing 
countries use as a sample in their study. Similarly, Salawu (2007) finds evidence that 
fixed assets have positive relationships with debt ratios. Also, Omet (2006) and Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) find evidence that fixed assets have positive relationships with debt 
ratios. However, Baner (2004) and Booth et al. (2001) find evidence that fixed assets 
have a negative relation with total debt ratio. Achy (2009) finds the relation between 
fixed assets and long-term debt is unclear. 
In summary, most empirical evidence, find conflicting results. The inconsistencies in 
findings of past researchers suggest the need for further studies in this area. In addition, 
it is interesting to know the effect of goodwill assets on debt ratios. It is hard to find 
studies in literature that investigate the relation between goodwill assets and debt. We 
therefore hypothesized in the H1 form that: 
H1: Fixed assets and goodwill assets have relation with long-term debt ratio.
H2: Fixed assets and goodwill assets have relation with total debt ratio. 
Past studies in the literature show differences exist in financial market develop-
ment of developed and developing countries, including Africa. However, Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Kunt and Maksimovic (1994), Booth et al. (2001) argue that similar 
factors affect the capital structure of both developing countries and developed countries. 
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Nevertheless, we need more studies in Africa, a developing country, to confirm Booth 
et al. (2001), Kunt and Maksimovic (1994) findings that similar factors affect the capital 
structure of developed and developing country.
This study departs from past capital structure studies in the following ways. First, we 
add goodwill assets to capital structure determinants because financial institutions ac-
cept it (as well as fixed assets) as collateral before granting debt finance. Recently, 
Loumioti (2011) study reveals that intangible assets such as goodwill assets increase 
borrower’s access to debt capital since it helps to reduce information asymmetry prob-
lem between lenders and borrowers. Second, the study specifies the dynamic panel 
model compare with the static model commonly use to conduct capital structure re-
search in Africa. It uses the panel generalize method of moments technique that control 
for the influence of unobserved firm-specific effects and endogenous problem.
2. Data and methodology 
We obtained our annual data from Bloomberg. We use top 100 listed firms on the Johan-
nesburg Stock Exchange from 2004 to 2009. Financial firms excluded because their fi-
nancial statement differs significantly from that of non-financial listed firms. Regulated 
firms also excluded because their debt ratio is usually higher than other nonfinancial 
firms are (Rajan, Zingales 1995). 
Past researchers (see Rajan, Zingales 1995; Frank, Goyal 2008; Eldomiaty, Ismail 2009; 
Nunkoo, Boateng 2010; Matemilola et al. 2012) use balance sheet and income statement 
data to conduct capital structure research. Similarly, we use balance sheet and income 
statement data to analyze adjustment to long-run optimal debt level predicted by dy-
namic trade-off theory. In addition, we use two measures of debt ratio - long-term debt 
and total debt ratios as well as goodwill assets as an additional variable. 
The study covers the period of 2004 to 2009 because there is no systemic shock in the 
chosen period that could significantly bias the results. All the top 100 listed firms use 
in this study do not have any missing values for all the years cover in this study (see 
Table 1). Thus, we use balanced panel data. 
Table 1. Sample characteristics
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where the subscript i and t represents a firm and time period respectively. We do not 
control for costs of debt issuance in our model because it has not changed over the 
sample period. Models (1) and (2) use generalized method of moments (GMM) that 
give better results. GMM ensures no correlation between the residuals and lagged in-
dependent variables. We use two measures of debt ratio as a proxy – ratio of long-term 
debt to total assets, and the ratio of total debt to total assets because there is evidence 
in the literature that both debt measures could give different results. In addition, we use 
total debt because it is a broader measure of debt that includes all liabilities claim on 
the firms. Profit measures as ratio of profit before interest and tax to total assets. Fixed 
assets measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Size measures as log of total 
assets. Goodwill value is available in the Bloomberg database for each year. Goodwill 
is measured as a log of excess market value over net operating assets each year, and 
tax (effective tax rate) measures as ratio of tax liability to income before tax multiply 
by 100. The independent variables in both models are proxies commonly used in the 
literature. The study uses the book value of debt because it is not affected by price 
fluctuation compare with the market value of debt.
2.1. Estimation method 
We apply Panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) that controls for unobserved 
firm-specific effects. GMM removes unobserved effects and uses instruments uncor-
related with the error term. Panel GMM is appropriate because it improves efficiency 
and it corrects the endogenous bias (Baltagi 2005). GMM uses moments, which make 
instruments uncorrelated with the error term (Ozkan 2001). 
Specifically, the study uses two-step difference GMM (Arellano, Bond 1991) which give 
better results. In addition, we use two-step systems GMM, which improve efficiency. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) add moments, which make correlation between unobservable 
effects and difference instrument, equal zero. Recent researchers (see Faulkender et al. 
2012; Nunkoo, Boateng 2010; Flannery, Rangan 2006, Ozkan 2001) use GMM estima-
tion technique to conduct capital structure research in developed countries. 
To analyze the effect of fixed assets and goodwill assets on South African firms’ debt, 
we follow the framework of Nunkoo and Boateng (2010) with changes. Nunkoo and 
Boateng (2010) use difference GMM and find firms adjust to target capital structure. 
In this study, we add system GMM that uses difference instruments and it improves 
efficiency. We analyze effects of fixed assets and goodwill assets on South African 
firms’ debt. This study departs from previous study because we add goodwill assets 
to the determinants of optimal debt ratio. Finance institutions are accepting goodwill 
assets (as well as fixed assets) as collateral to obtain long-term debt capital. Loumioti 
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(2011) study reveals that intangible assets such as goodwill assets increase borrower’s 
access to debt capital since it helps to reduce information asymmetry problem between 
lenders and borrowers. 
After taking first difference, we remove all variables that are time-invariant, such as 
unobservable firm-specific effects from the model. In difference model, error term cor-
related with lagged dependent variable. Hence, we use higher lags of the lagged de-
pendent variable as instruments. In addition, we use higher lag of explanatory variables 
as instruments. However, difference GMM estimation gives unbiased and consistent 
estimators if the following moment conditions hold:
  (3)
  (4)
where X is explanatory variables in the model use as instruments and µit is the error 
term. Blundell and Bond (1998) add moments, which make correlation between unob-
servable effects (ηi) and difference instruments equal zero.
3. Results and discussions 
We report descriptive statistics and correlation in Table 2. The mean value of long-term 
debt is 13.00 compared to the mean value of total debt that is 20.14. Long-term debt 
and total debt are in the same units (millions), thus, the reason for the difference is that 
total debt includes short term debt. Hence, mean value of total debt should be higher. 
The low correlation between variables shows little risk of multicollinearity problem in 
the data. We specify two models. Long-term debt ratio is the dependent variable in the 
model one, while the total debt ratio is the dependent variable in model two. We use 
two-step GMM estimates because it gives better results if based on two-step estimates. 
Furthermore, second order serial correlation test and the difference Sargan test reveal 
that instruments are valid. Thus, we can apply the generalized method of moments. 
The results show there is an absence of second order serial correlation in both models. 
Moreover, the Sargan test and difference Sargan test show valid instruments for both 
models. Therefore, we continue with interpretation of GMM results. 
The estimated coefficients using the difference Generalized Method of Moment are 
significant and have the expected sign. Lagged long-term debt shows positive sign and 
significant at the 1 percent level. These results support the dynamic trade-off theory 
that firm adjusts to optimal debt level. Similarly, lagged total debt is positive and sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level (see Table 3). The lagged dependent variable coefficients 
are significant in both models. This indicates South African firms have optimal debt 
and they make an effort to adjust to long-run optimal debt level. The adjustment speed 
is calculated as (1 – λ), where l refers to the value of the estimated coefficient of the 
lagged debt variable in the dynamic panel models. Firms that deviate from their optimal 
debt ratios will undertake an adjustment process to their optimal debt level. However, 
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market imperfections such as transaction costs may prevent firms from instantaneous 
adjustment to their optimal debt level. The adjustment speeds (calculated as 1 – λ) 
are slow for the lagged coefficient of long-term debt ratio (1 – 0.682 = 0.318) and for 
lagged coefficient of total debt ratio (1 – 0.601 = 0.399). The adjustment speed is slow 
compared with De Miguel and Pindado (2001) that reports adjustment speed of 0.79 
for Spanish firms and Ozkan (2001) that reports adjustment speed of 0.55 for the UK 
firms. This slows adjustment speeds imply adjustment costs preventing South African 
firms from adjusting faster to long-run optimal debt level. Further, since adjustment 
speeds are slow, the results imply costs of deviating from optimal debt level may be 
less important for South African firms. 
Besides, the results reveal that fixed assets and goodwill assets have significant and 
positive relationship with long-term debt and total debt. The evidence of a positive 
relation between fixed assets and debt ratios suggest that South African firms need to 
give collateral before obtaining debt capital. Specifically, the result implies that South 
African firms use fixed assets as collateral when negotiating borrowing, especially long 
term borrowing. 
Additionally, the results suggest collateral (fixed assets) reduces the information asym-
metry problem when firms approach banks for debt finance. Firms that have more fixed 
assets get long-term debt capital easily even if they do not disclose all information to 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Mean and standard deviations
LD TD Profit FA Size Tax Goodwill
 Mean 13.00 20.14 12.87 18.52 7.09 23.73 2.32
Std. dev. 12.66 14.21 9.24 5.30 12.19 13.40 1.16
Panel B. Correlation coefficients
LD TD Profit FA Size Tax Goodwill
LD 1.00   
TD 0.75 1.00    
Profit –0.13 –0.21 1.00   
FA  0.02 0.03 0.06 1.00  
Size –0.05 0.06 0.18 –0.02 1.00  
Tax –0.02 0.11 0.11 –0.07 0.37 1.00
Goodwill 0.36 0.30 –0.15 –0.06 –0.30 0.27 1.00
Notes: Long-term debt (LD) is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Total debt 
(TD) is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Profit is the ratio of profit before interest 
and tax to total assets. Fixed assets (FA) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
Size is the log of total assets. Tax is ratio of tax liability to income before tax times 
100. Goodwill assets measure as log of excess market value over net operating assets 
each year. We obtain goodwill values from Bloomberg. 
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banks. The estimated coefficient for fixed assets is twice that of goodwill assets for the 
difference generalized method of moment results. The reason could be that fixed assets 
are more preferred as collateral when firms want to obtain long-term debt financing. 
However, this result is not robust in the system generalized method of moment results. 
Conversely, profit is statistically significant and has a negative relationship with debt. 
The results of this study are consistent with the findings of Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Delcoure (2007) and Salawu (2007) who find evidence that fixed assets have positive 
relationships with debt ratios. The results are also consistent with findings of Nunkoo 
and Boateng (2010), Flannery and Rangan (2006) who find evidence that firm adjust 
their debt ratios to long-run optimal debt level as predicted by dynamic trade-off theory. 
Conversely, the result contradicts findings of Baner (2004) and Booth et al. (2001), and 
who find evidence that fixed assets has a negative relationship with debt. 
3.1. Robustness of the results 
We conduct a number of tests to examine the robustness of the results. First, the study 
examines the sensitivity of the results to alternative model specification. Specifically, 
the study uses system-generalize method of moments (System GMM). We find lagged 
total debt and long-term debt are significant at 1 percent (see Table 4). This suggests 
Table 3. Generalized method of moment estimates (two-step difference GMM) 
Dependent variable Long term debt Total debt
Independent variables GMM (difference) GMM (difference)
LDit-1 / TDit-1 0.682***    (12.14) 0.601***   (5.74) 
Profit –0.111** (–2.45) –0.171*** (–4.03) 
Fixed assets 0.080**      (2.50) 0.082***    (3.43) 
Size 0.239** (2.49) –0.814*** (–7.49) 
Goodwill assets 0.048** (2.16) 0.036** (2.54) 
Tax –0.080    (–1.06) –0.005 (–0.10) 
2nd order serial correl. (p-value) 0.7293 0.8827
Sargan Test (p-values) 0.9575 0.5227
Notes: Long-term debt (LD) is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Total debt (TD) is 
the ratio of total debt to total assets. Profit is the ratio of profit before interest and tax to total 
assets. Fixed assets (FA) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Size is the log of total assets. 
Tax is ratio of tax liability to income before tax times 100. Goodwill assets measure as log 
of excess market value over net operating assets each year. We obtain goodwill values from 
Bloomberg. The numbers in parentheses are test statistics. The model estimated using Dynamic 
Panel program used by Are-llano and Bond (1991). ** and *** indicate coefficient is significant 
at 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. Second order correlation that has N (0, 1) distribution, but 
null uncorrelated with errors. f Standard errors are robust for difference GMM results. Sargan 
(1958) over identification tested and nulled that instruments are valid. Sargan (1958) test runs if 
the error is GMM type (Stata xtabond command). N = 100, T = 6, instruments = 16.
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South African firms adjust their debt to optimal debt level. Second, we perform second 
order serial correlation tests because generalized method of moments gives consistent 
estimates if there is an absence of second order serial correlation in the error terms. The 
test results show absence of second order serial correlation in the error terms. Thus, 
GMM is suitable for estimating the parameters of interest. Third, we perform Sargan 
test and difference Sargan test of instruments validity because GMM gives consistent 
estimates for valid instruments. The Sargan test indicates the instruments are valid – 
uncorrelated with the error term. Besides, we specify dynamic panel models and use 
two different proxies as the dependent variable to see if the results are similar. Indeed, 
we find similar results. Fixed assets and goodwill assets are significant and they have 
positive effects on long-term debt and total debt ratios. 
Conclusions 
The paper analyses the effects of fixed assets and goodwill assets on South African 
firms’ debt ratios. The results reveal fixed assets and goodwill assets are statistically 
significant, and positively related to long-term debt ratio. Similarly, fixed assets and 
goodwill assets are statistically significant, and positively related to total debt ratio. This 
Tale 4. Generalized method of moment estimates (Two-step system GMM) 
Dependent variable Long term debt Total debt
Independent variables GMM (system) GMM (system)
LDit-1 / TDit-1 0.688***   (12.82) 0.535***    (4.40) 
Profit –0.102** (–2.67) –0.154*** (–6.03) 
Fixed assets           0.030** (2.06) 0.061**   (2.77) 
Size –0.054   (-0.53) –0.068   (–0.46) 
Goodwill assets  0.047** (2.01) 0.029**   (2.26) 
Tax –0 .021    (–1.19) 0.025     (0.78) 
2nd order serial correl. (p-value) 0.4906 0.2192
Difference Sargan Test (p-values) 0.1427 0.2113
Notes: Long-term debt (LD) is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Total debt (TD) 
is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Profit is the ratio of profit before interest and tax to 
total assets. Fixed assets (FA) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Size is the log of total 
assets. Tax is ratio of tax liability to income before tax times 100. Goodwill assets measure 
as log of excess market value over net operating assets each year. We obtain goodwill values 
from Bloomberg. The numbers in parentheses are test statistics. The model estimated using 
Dynamic Panel program used by Blundell and Bond (1998). ** and *** indicate coefficient 
is significant at 5 and 1percent levels respectively. Second order correlation that has N (0, 1) 
distribution, but null uncorrelated with errors. f Standard errors are robust for system GMM 
results. Difference Sargan (1958) over identification tests and nulls that instruments are valid. 
Difference Sargan (1958) test runs if the error are GMM type (Stata xtdpdsys command). 
N = 100, T = 6, Instruments = 20. 
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implies fixed assets and goodwill assets needed as collateral for getting debt capital in 
South Africa. This supports findings of Loumioti (2011) that goodwill assets increase 
borrower’s access to debt capital since it helps to reduce information asymmetry be-
tween borrowers and lenders. The size coefficients show inconsistent sign in the results. 
This suggests size may not be consistent determinants of capital structure in South 
Africa. Tax is insignificant in the results. These are not surprising because past studies 
also reported inconsistent results for size and tax variables. 
Further, the results reveal that South African firms’ adjust to long-run optimal debt level, 
which support dynamic trade-off theory. Lagged dependent variables show positive sign 
and significant at 1 percent in all results. Moreover, the study reveals that South African 
firms have long-run optimal debt level, but the adjustment speeds are slow. At such 
slow adjustment speeds, it will take South African firms longer years to close the gap 
between their actual debt and optimal debt level. This implies under or over leveraged 
firms slowly adjusts to long-run optimal debt level. The slow adjustment speeds could 
be that there are costs preventing South African firms from adjusting faster to long-run 
optimal debt level. In addition, speeds of adjustment have an inverse relation with ad-
justment costs. The results further imply costs of deviating from the optimal debt level 
may be insignificant for South African firms. 
The study implies the dynamic nature of capital structure decisions deserves attention 
in South Africa. In general, this study shows that empirical evidence on the dynamic 
trade-off theory found in developed countries is also applicable to South Africa, despite 
the institutional differences that exist between them. Furthermore, the results imply that 
policy makers should identify the point beyond which further increases in debt becomes 
a threat to firms. Put differently, policy makers need to assess sustainable debt to iden-
tify firms that need to reduce debt in their capital structure to avoid possible bankruptcy 
at higher debt level. The results suggest the need for further development of the capital 
markets in order to reduce costs preventing firms from adjusting faster to their optimal 
debt ratio. Moreover, firms need both fixed assets and goodwill assets as collateral to 
raise the desired optimal debt that maximizes firm value. 
The paper contributes to empirical research on capital structure in three ways. Firstly, 
the paper provides new evidence that goodwill assets are statistically significant, 
and positively related to debt ratios. Secondly, the paper represents one of the lim-
ited available studies that empirically analyze adjustment to long-run optimal debt 
level for fast growing South Africa. Third, the study apply a dynamic panel model 
compared with a static model commonly use to conduct capital structure research in 
Africa. It uses generalized method of moments techniques that address endogenous 
problem. We address the endogenous problem by using efficient instrumental variable 
techniques. 
The paper applies the generalized method of moment (GMM) that addresses the en-
dogenous problem. GMM reduces bias in estimating coefficients, but it does not ad-
dress differences in firms’ speed of adjustment to optimal debt level. It is possible 
that speeds of adjustment vary across firms, which the study does not cover. Future 
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research needs to investigate how firm adjust in asymmetric way towards target debt 
with the use of dynamic panel threshold model. Dynamic panel threshold estimates 
heterogeneous speeds of adjustment in different regimes as well as test for the thresh-
old effect. Besides, future research may consider goodwill assets as determinant of 
capital structure. 
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